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AIDS, INSURANCE AND THE ADA
SUSAN J. STABILE*
The topic of the second symposium panel is AIDS, Insurance
and the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA").' This topic covers
a broad range of potential issues.
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") was part of
the discussion surrounding the ADA even before the act became
effective, mainly due to the Fifth Circuit's 1992 decision in Mc-
Gann v. H & H Music Co.,2 a decision the Supreme Court declined
to review. McGann, a decision which received a great deal of at-
tention, held that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA) 3 does not prevent an employer from reducing
benefits available to its employees for the treatment of AIDS and
AIDS-related illnesses. 4 The Court made this determination even
though the employer's knowledge of the plaintiff's illness was a
motivating factor in the employer's decision to impose a five thou-
sand dollar cap on AIDS-related benefit claims.5
In that case, the Fifth Circuit did not, of course, address the
impact of the ADA on the employer's behavior, since the em-
ployer's activity took place before the Act became effective. 6 The
question thus remains, does the ADA do what ERISA does not?
Does it prevent an employer from excluding AIDS from coverage
in medical plans or limiting benefits payable for AIDS claims but
not for other illnesses? The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission clearly believes that the ADA does exclude such disease-
* Professor Stabile is an Associate Professor of Law at St. John's University School of
Law. B.A., Georgetown University, 1979; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1982.
1 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (Supp. V 1993).
2 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 113
S. Ct. 482 (1992).
3 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (Supp. V 1993).
4 McGann, 946 F.2d at 406.
5 Id. at 405.
6 See Id. The ADA became effective in July of 1992. The changes to the H & H Music
plan at issue in McGann were made in July 1988. Id.
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specific limitations,7 and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
suggested the same conclusion in its decision in Carparts Distri-
bution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n.8 However, not
everyone agrees.9
Even though this debate over capping benefits has been couched
in terms of AIDS, it applies to any disease constituting a disability
within the meaning of the ADA that an employer may single out
for disparate treatment. There are certainly other diseases, for
example kidney disease, that are costly to treat.10
In addition to the cap or limitation issue, AIDS raises other is-
sues. For example, how should we deal with the health care needs
of those with AIDS and the extent to which someone seeking
worker's compensation can be forced to undergo HIV testing?
Outside the AIDS arena, the recent First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision in the Carparts," case addressed a fairly funda-
mental question about the ADA: how is the employer defined? In
that decision, the First Circuit determined that, under certain cir-
cumstances, an insurance company may be an employer subject to
ADA's prohibitions. 12 Based on interpretations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, 3 the Court determined when the insurance com-
pany functioned as an employer with respect to an employee's
health care coverage. An insurer is deemed to function as an em-
ployer for ADA purposes if it exercises control over an important
aspect of an employee's employment.' 4 The question then be-
comes: is Carparts correct, or does following its reasoning give the
ADA a broader reach than originally intended by Congress?
Questions under the ADA that relate more directly to insurance
itself have also surfaced. For example, can an employer get insur-
ance coverage for claims brought under the ADA? Or, since viola-
tion of the ADA is an intentional act, is an employer precluded, as
7 See Laborers District Council Buildings and Construction Health and Welfare Fund,
EEOC Charge No. 170-93-0899 (Sept. 1993); Mason Tenders District Council Trust Fund,
EEOC Charge No. 160-93-0419 (Jan. 1993).
8 37 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1994).
9 See The Impact of the ADA on Medical Plans, 1 ERISA Litig. Rep. 18, 21 (1992).
10 See Terry A.M. Mumford et al., Coordinating Employee Benefits with the Americans
with Disabilities Act, C940 A.L.I. 305, 337 (1994) (discussing disability-based distinctions).
11 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
12 Id. at 16-17.
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
14 Carparts, 37 F.3d at 17.
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a matter of public policy, from being able to insure against such
claims?
These are all issues that are unclear based on the language of
the ADA and will be focused on in this symposium panel.

